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Between the Hash Marks
THE ABSOLUTE POWER THE NFL’S COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT GRANTS ITS
COMMISSIONER
INTRODUCTION
For many Americans, Sundays revolve around one
thing—the National Football League (the NFL or the League).
Fans come from all over to watch their favorite teams compete
and partake in a sport that has become more than just a game.
Sunday worries for NFL fans consist of painting their faces,
tailgating, and setting their fantasy lineups.1 For professional
football players, football is a way to earn a living; touchdowns,
yards, and big hits highlight ESPN’s top plays,2 generating a
multibillion-dollar industry.3 Like the other three major sports
leagues,4 the NFL is governed by a multitude of intricate rules,
regulations, and agreements that dictate the employment and
1 Fantasy sports involve fans signing up for a league and creating a virtual
team. To create a team, fans conduct a draft, online or offline, where they select players
from a professional sports league, thus creating their own ideal or “fantasy” team. Fans
then compete against each other in their league, and their success is determined based
on their players’ “real-game” statistics. Chris Isidore, Fantasy Sports: What Is It,
Anyway?, CNN MONEY (Oct. 6, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/10/06/news/companies/
fantasy-sports-101/ [https://perma.cc/UM2Z-JAG2].
2 “ESPN” is an acronym that used to stand for Entertainment and Sports
Programming Network. Frequently Asked Questions, ESPN (Jan. 14, 2014), http://m.espn.
go.com/general/story?storyId=1457975&src=desktop&wjb [https://perma.cc/2CLN-4AQT].
3 Monte Burke, How the National Football League Can Reach $25 Billion in
Annual Revenues, FORBES (Aug. 17, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/monteburke/201
3/08/17/how-the-national-football-league-can-reach-25-billion-in-annual-revenues/#411b7
d873ad0 [https://perma.cc/66W5-KEB3].
4 See Collective Bargaining Agreement Between National Hockey League and
National Hockey League Players’ Association arts. 17–18-A (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.
nhl.com/nhl/en/v3/ext/CBA2012/NHL_NHLPA_2013_CBA.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5XS-CV
3Z] [hereinafter NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement]; Major League Baseball
Collective Bargaining Agreement: 2012–2016 Basic Agreement art. XI (2012), http://mlb.
mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/UY3D-EYLS] [hereinafter MLB Basic
Agreement]; NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Nat’l Basketball Ass’n art. XXXI
(Dec. 8, 2011), https://ipmall.law.unh.edu/sites/default/files/hosted_resources/SportsEnt
Law_Institute/2011NBA_NBPA_CBA(final%20version).pdf [https://perma.cc/QP7Y-A3X2]
[hereinafter NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement].
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conduct of football players.5 In order for fans to watch their
favorite players make one-handed catches, hit homeruns, or fly
through the air and dunk a basketball, team owners and unions
representing players have come to agreements that allow their
employer-employee relationship to function properly. These
relationships are covered by Collective Bargaining Agreements
(CBAs) which provide players and team owners with rules and
regulations governing many facets of their relationship such as
employment conditions, eligibility, grievances, and base
salaries.6 In addition to these areas, each of the four7 major
leagues’ CBAs has extensive sections outlining disciplinary
action that may be enforced if necessary.8
Over the last few years, the NFL has received much
criticism from the public, NFL officials, and the legal
community over how its disciplinary process has been handled.
Domestic abuse,9 the illegal deflation of game-used footballs,10
and a program undertaken by the New Orleans Saints to injure
fellow athletes for money11 are some of the heinous actions
players have taken part in or have been accused of committing
that have negatively impacted the public’s perception of the
NFL. These incidents have called into question the ability of
the NFL Commissioner, Roger Goodell, to properly handle such
disciplinary matters for player conduct that he has considered
“detrimental to the integrity of . . . the game of professional
football.”12 Goodell not only has the power to discipline players
for such conduct, but also the power to review player appeals
for punishments he imposed by electing himself arbitrator over
5 See generally Collective Bargaining Agreement between National Football
League and National Football League Players Association (2011), http://nfllabor.files.
wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement-2011-2020.pdf [https://perma.c
c/6A6J-QY34] [hereinafter NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement].
6 What Are Collective Bargaining Agreements and How Are They Used in
Sport?, IN BRIEF (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.inbrief.co.uk/sports-law/collective-bargaini
ng-agreements-in-sport/ [https://perma.cc/36QK-MWHU].
7 The four major sports leagues discussed in this note include the National
Football League (NFL), Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball
Association (NBA), and the National Hockey League (NHL).
8 See NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 5; MLB Basic
Agreement, supra note 4, at art. XII; NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note
4, at art. XXXI; NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 4, at arts. 18, 18-A.
9 Key Events in the Ray Rice Story, CNN (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.cnn.
com/2014/09/09/us/ray-rice-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/KHJ2-BM99].
10 Chris Mortensen, 11 of 12 Pats Footballs Underinflated, ESPN (Jan. 21,
2015), http://www.espn.com/boston/nfl/story/_/id/12202450/nfl-says-new-england-patriots-
had-inflated-footballs-afc-championship-game [https://perma.cc/6Q7U-MVJE].
11 Saints Bounty Scandal, ESPN (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.espn.com/nfl/
topics/_/page/new-orleans-saints-bounty-scandal [https://perma.cc/Z24W-P9PZ].
12 See NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 46, § 1(a).
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such grievances under Article 46 of the NFL CBA.13 While
many may blame Goodell for the turmoil the League has
recently experienced and claim that he has abused his power as
the NFL’s disciplinarian, this note will show that it is the overly
broad language of the CBA that grants Goodell vast amounts of
discretion to act as the judge, jury, and executioner of the
League’s disciplinary matters when dealing with on-field player
conduct or conduct deemed “detrimental to the integrity of . . . the
game of professional football.”14 A revision of Article 46 of the NFL
CBA would help lessen the overarching power of Goodell, and
ensure that players are receiving fair appeals reviewed by
impartial arbitrators.
In order to further demonstrate that the language of the
CBA is the source of the NFL’s flawed disciplinary process, Part
I of this note provides a brief history of the development of the
NFL, MLB, NBA, and NHL’s CBAs, respectively, while
demonstrating the importance of arbitral hearings within sports.
Part II discusses the NFL CBA specifically, and the particular
provisions that have caused issues in recent years. Part III
provides a comparative analysis by examining how the NBA,
MLB, and NHL have deployed their CBAs in comparison to that
of the NFL. Part IV proposes a change to the disciplinary
process that limits the Commissioner’s power as the League’s
sole disciplinarian when dealing with on-field player conduct or
conduct deemed detrimental to the game of football.
I. COIN TOSS: THEDEVELOPMENT OF THE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT ACROSS THE LEAGUES
Before CBAs, players in professional leagues were at the
mercy of contracts dictated by team owners.15 Owners would
often “collude” over a variety of matters such as player
salaries.16 Disputes between league owners and athletes quickly
required the existence of collective bargaining agreements to
prevent the occurrence of lockouts.17 Negotiated and agreed upon
13 See id. at § 2(a).
14 Id. at § 1(a).
15 PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXTS, CASES AND PROBLEMS
155 (West Publishing Co., 5th ed. 2015).
16 Id.
17 Lockouts are when owners or management decides to prohibit their
employees from attending work over a disagreement between the two sides. Lockouts
often involve the hiring of replacement workers to maintain the company’s business
while the original workers are being kept from their jobs. John W. Schoen, Strike or
Lockout: What’s the Difference?, CNBC (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/02/
20/strike-or-lockout-whats-the-difference.html [https://perma.cc/H3YC-J7PQ] (referring
to lockouts generally rather than specifically).
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by players’ unions and team owners, the CBA is meant to create
a principal, binding authority for players and team owners that
“establishes specific elements of how the league will operate,
such as: division of league revenues, team salary caps, free
agency requirements, restrictions on player mobility, provisions
regarding the drafting of players, disciplinary rules, and other
general regulations of the league.”18 While CBAs govern nearly
all interaction between players, owners, and league officials, the
National Labor Relations Board has the authority to claim
jurisdiction over certain claims if they greatly affect commerce.19
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA),20
enforced by an independent federal agency called the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board),21 is tasked with
governing “the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the
free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining.”22 Although the
Board decides when it has jurisdiction over a labor dispute, it
can decline such jurisdiction if the dispute has a minimal effect
on commerce.23 After the NLRB claimed jurisdiction over the
MLB in a 1969 adjudication,24 the Supreme Court enforced its
jurisdiction over the MLB in Flood v. Kuhn by explicitly stating
that the MLB engaged in interstate commerce.25 The NLRB’s
18 Brittany L. Forgues, Collective Bargaining Agreements and What Has
Changed in the NBA and NFL, MSLAW BLOG (Sept. 2012), http://www.mslaw.edu/
verdict-3/ [https://perma.cc/MC52-7E3B].
19 See infra notes 20–23 and accompanying text.
20 The NLRA was created by Congress in 1935 to “protect the rights of employees
and employers, to encourage collective bargaining, and to curtail certain private sector labor
and management practices, which can harm the general welfare of workers, businesses and
the U.S. economy.”National Labor Relations Act, NAT’LLABORRELATIONSBD., https://www.
nlrb.gov/resources/national-labor-relations-act [https://perma.cc/HA3P-JAJP] (last visited
Nov. 23, 2016); seeNational Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012).
21 Jason La Canfora, NFL Says Players’ Union is ‘Surface Bargaining’ So It
Can File Suit, NFL (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d81e4de6d/
printable/nfl-says-players-union-is-surface-bargaining-so-it-can-file-suit [https://perma.
cc/K7F8-WZDG].
22 National Labor Relations Act, supra note 20.
23 The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published
rules . . . decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any
class or category of employers, where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect
of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant
the exercise of its jurisdiction.
29 U.S.C. § 164(14)(c)(1).
24 Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969). The Board found
that the MLB largely affected interstate commerce in many ways, and despite having an
internal self-regulation system in place, its inadequacy to regulate the owner-player
relationship in the MLB granted the Board jurisdiction over the MLB. Id. at 193–94.
25 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
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work in the MLB and NFL following the 1987 NFL strike26
established that the NLRA can and continues to be applied to
the four major sports leagues in the United States.27 After the
NFL and its players’ union, the National Football League
Players Association (NFLPA), adopted the 1993 NFL CBA, the
NFLPA became a certified union under the NLRB.28 Each
league’s CBA includes arbitration procedures that allow
players and league management to resolve disputes within the
league itself and prevent the need to go to court. However, these
procedures and the arbitral awards they produce are often the
source of litigation themselves.
A. Reasons for CBAs’ Arbitration Policies Before Federal
Court Intervention
Each of the leagues’ CBAs contains arbitration procedures
that allow athletes to file grievances against league punishments
they feel are undeserved or excessive.29 Such procedures entitle
athletes to arbitration hearings, with parties dictated by the
leagues’ CBAs, where they can challenge the legitimacy of the
punishment they received under the CBA.30 Arbitration is meant
to resolve a dispute in the most efficient way without interference
by the courts.31 When dealing with an employer-employee
agreement, which exists between professional athletes and team
owners, an arbitrator’s duty is to review whether the punishment
imposed adheres to principles of due process and fairness under
the NLRA and applicable CBA.32 Any type of arbitral decision
that is not in accordance with federal law or the league’s CBA
creates the risk of violating players’ due process rights.
26 See NFL Players Share in Record Settlement: Labor Relations: $30-Million
Judgment Arising from 1987 Strike Will be Divided Among About 1,300., L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 13, 1994), http://articles.latimes.com/1994-09-13/sports/sp-37895_1_labor-relations
[https://perma.cc/7QMR-36N5].
27 See Impact of the NLRB on Professional Sports, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD.,
https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-history/impact-nlrb-professional-sports [https://perma.
cc/AC3J-ZMTJ].
28 History: The 1990’s—Growth of the Union, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, https://www.
nflpa.com/about/history [https://perma.cc/B5Y8-W4G9].
29 The leagues differ on which parties can serve as arbitrators once players
appeal or start the grievance procedure. See discussion infra Sections I.B–E.
30 See discussion infra Sections I.B–E.
31 What Is Arbitration? MEDIATE.COM, http://www.mediate.com/articles/grant.cfm
[https://perma.cc/JUH8-HZJ5].
32 NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 462
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 954 F.2d 801, 809 (2d
Cir. 1992)) (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974)).
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While the NFL CBA gives the Commissioner the ability
to review disciplinary actions he or she has imposed on athletes33
for on-field player conduct or conduct that is detrimental to the
game of football (“detrimental conduct”),34 this power may
potentially violate players’ federal due process rights. The
purpose of these grievance arbitrations is for players to receive a
fair, unbiased review of whether the punishment was justified
under the provisions of the CBA. The potential for players’ due
process rights to be violated when Goodell reviews appeals of his
own disciplinary decisions, however, requires Federal Court
intervention in arbitral awards to ensure adequate due process.
Because the NFL CBA’s arbitral process has failed to prevent
the need for court intervention evidenced by recent litigation,
provisions of the CBA need to be rewritten to better protect
players’ due process rights.
While federal courts can review arbitral decisions,
decisions made by arbitrators are typically given great
deference.35 Courts generally do not review the fact-findings of
arbitrators, but courts do, however, review decisions for fairness
and due process concerns.36 Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration
Act requires that arbitral awards be fair and provide due process
in order to be upheld.37 Under this statute, a reviewing court
needs to determine “whether the arbitrator’s award draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement, since the
arbitrator is not free to merely dispense his own brand of
industrial justice.”38 As in the cases of Tom Brady39 and Adrian
Peterson,40 both athletes challenged their arbitral decisions for
numerous reasons—including the absence of impartiality of the
arbitrator during their inter-NFL appeal.41 Fairness in arbitral
33 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 46, § 2(a) (showing
why such disciplinary authority is given to the Commissioner).
34 Id. at art. 46, § (1)(a).
35 NFL Mgmt. Council, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 463 (citing Westerbeke Corp. v.
Daihatsu Motor Co., Ltd., 304 F.3d 200, 213–14 (2d Cir. 2002)). “An arbitrator’s factual
findings are generally not open to judicial challenge, and we accept the facts as the
arbitrator found them.” Id.
36 Id. at 462.
37 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012). Under section 10 of the
Federal Arbitration Act, a United States court can vacate an award when found on
fraudulent premises or corruption, when arbitrators were not impartial, where arbitrators
prejudice one of the parties by refusing to hear material evidence or postponing, or when
arbitrators exceed the power ordained to them. Id.
38 NFL Mgmt. Council, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 462 (quoting 187 Concourse
Assocs. v. Fishman, 399 F.3d 524, 527 (2d Cir. 2005)).
39 See infra Section II.A for a discussion on Tom Brady’s suspension after
being accused of deflating footballs during an NFL game.
40 See infra Section II.B for a discussion on Adrian Peterson’s suspension after
being accused of taking part in off-field conduct detrimental to the game of football.
41 See infra Section II.C.
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decisions is of the utmost importance. Although these decisions
are not reviewed often, they are given a high level of deference
when courts are asked to intervene. Because arbitral decisions
are given substantial weight, it is crucial to ensure impartial
decisions and limit the League Commissioner from arbitrating
his own disciplinary decisions by changing the language of the
CBA that grants Goodell such authority.42 The next section of
this note will outline the history of the use of the NFL’s CBA
and take a look at how the current CBA is problematic in regard
to Goodell’s arbitration power. Then, a comparative analysis of
the NFL’s CBA and other leagues’ CBAs will be done to find a
better way of designing the disciplinary process for the NFL that
encourages due process.
B. National Football League: Road to Today’s CBA
NFL players first attempted to unionize as a players’
association behind Creighton Miller in 1956.43 After drafting a
proposal of player demands44 and submitting it to League
Commissioner Bert Bell, the young player association never
received a response from Bell.45 In 1968, the NFL and NFLPA
agreed on a deal, marking the NFL owners’ acknowledgment of
the NFLPA as the players’ means of representation.46 The
headlining provisions of the 1968 Agreement included a minimum
wage for players, an insurance plan, an improved pension plan,
and the “Rozelle Rule.”47 Players quickly took issue with the 1968
CBA, especially the Rozelle Rule that essentially prohibited all
player movement or free agency.48 John Mackey, the NFLPA’s
president, argued that the rule violated Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.49 The court inMackey v. National Football League found that
the restraints put on teams when signing free agents did not
serve any legitimate business purpose—making it overly
42 NFLCollective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 46, §§ 1(a), 2(a).
43 History: The Beginning—1956, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, https://www.nflpa.com/
about/history [https://perma.cc/AP3S-8334] (originating out of the players’ demand for a
minimum $5,000 yearly salary and a continued salary for injured players).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 NFL Labor History Since 1968, ESPN, http://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?
page=nfl_labor_history [https://perma.cc/GR67-VMQ9] (last visited Nov. 23, 2016). While
this marked the NFL’s recognition of the NFLPA, the NLRB did not recognize the NFLPA
as the player’s union until 1993.History: The 1990’s—Growth of the Union, supra note 28.
47 Ryan T. Dryer, Comment, Beyond the Box Score: A Look at Collective
Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports and Their Effect on Competition, 2008 J.
DISP. RESOL. 267, 281 (2008). Litigation ensued over the Rozelle Rule, which called for teams
to send draft picks or players to a free agent’s former team upon signing the player. Id.
48 Id.
49 Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (D. Minn. 1975).
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restrictive,50 forcing the NFL and NFLPA to renegotiate a new
CBA.51 The newly formed 1977 CBA included limited free
agency with compensation, increased benefits, an option clause,
and grievance procedures for athletes to dispute treatment they
deemed unfair.52
Following the 1977 CBA, the League faced two player
strikes within the next ten years that were focused primarily
around the issues of revenue sharing and free agency.53 Following
the strikes, the players won two landmark victories in court that
had monumental effects on future NFL CBAs.54 In McNeil v.
National Football League, a jury struck down the owners “Plan B”
system55 finding that it violated antitrust law by adding
unnecessary restrictions under the NLRB.56 The NFLPA then
filed a second suit on behalf of former Philadelphia Eagle Keith
Jackson, who was an unsigned player under Plan B when the
court announced itsMcNeil verdict.57 In 1992, Judge Doty granted
the NFLPA’s injunction against Plan B, which allowed Jackson
and other players to become unrestricted free agents for five days
where they were able to sign with any team they wanted.58 These
two cases led to discussions between the NFLPA’s former
executive director, Gene Upshaw, and Commissioner Tagliabue,59
50 Id. at 1007.
51 See id. at 1007–08; see also History: The 1970’s—AFL and NFL Players
Associations Merge, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS’N, https://www.nflpa.com/
about/history [https://perma.cc/G73S-F4PS] (Players’ hatred of the Rozelle Rule and
yearning for a new CBA came from the Rule’s practical prevention of free agency.).
52 See Dryer, supra note 47, at 282.
53 In 1982, a two-month strike occurred due to the players’ “percentage-of-
gross proposal” whereby players argued that 55% of the clubs’ league-revenue should
be dispersed amongst them based on years of service, playtime, and performance.
History: The 1980’s—Era of Change, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, https://www.nflpa.com/about/
history [https://perma.cc/G73S-F4PS]. The second strike came in 1987 when the owners
rejected the players’ free agency demands they desired in the new CBA. Id. The players
quickly ended the strike, and instead filed unfair labor practice charges with the
NLRB, and an antitrust lawsuit against the NFL for imposing anti-competitive player
restraints on the Right of First Refusal and the compensation system. Id.
54 History: The 1990’s—Growth of the Union, supra note 28.
55 Plan B “allows each team to retain limited rights to 37 players each season.
A protected player is unable to s [sic] sign with other teams without giving his old team
the first chance to sign him or forcing his new club to compensate his old club if he goes
elsewhere.” Mike Freeman, NFL Is in Violation of Antitrust Laws, Jury Decides, THE
TECH (Cambridge, Mass.), Sept. 11, 1992, at 3.
56 History: The 1990’s—Growth of the Union, supra note 28.
57 Id.
58 NFL Labor History Since 1968, supra note 46.
59 Tagliabue served as NFL commissioner from 1989–2006 and was brought
in by Goodell to conduct an independent appeals hearing following the “Bountygate”
scandal, when Goodell levied harsh penalties on New Orleans Saints player and
personnel for their involvement in an alleged bounty program that rewarded players
for big hits and injuries to other players. James Montgomery, Roger Goodell Ripped by
Former NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.
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which resulted in a new CBA in 1993 that allowed for both free
agency and a salary cap.60 Following the 1993 CBA, the NFLPA
became a certified union under the NLRB.61
The 1993 CBA remained in effect for the next eighteen
years, during which it was extended five times until its
expiration in 2011.62 Before the 2011 season, League owners
locked out the players since they were unable to agree on a new
CBA.63 The lockout started following the owners’ decision to opt
out of the 2006 CBA in 2008, which left the NFL without a
salary cap for the next two years.64 In the process of eventually
ending the lockout and signing a new CBA in 2011,65 the
players made great strides in expanding their rights under the
current CBA for better grievance procedures and health and
safety conditions.66 The league agreed to longer rest periods
between practices and to set-up trust funds for former players
experiencing both physical and emotional pain.67 This current
CBA may address many of the League’s earlier problems—from
the “Rozelle Rule” to the “Plan B” system—but it also includes
language granting Commissioner Goodell too much power over
the disciplinary process.
Under the current NFL CBA, player appeals are divided
into disputes that fall under “Grievances” and those that fall
under “Commissioner Discipline.”68 A grievance is defined as
“[a]ny dispute . . . arising after the execution of this Agreement
and involving the interpretation of . . . any provision of this
rollingstone.com/culture/news/roger-goodell-ripped-by-former-nfl-commissioner-paul-tagli
abue-20150126 [https://perma.cc/GXT9-57DC].
60 History: The 1990’s—Growth of the Union, supra note 28.
61 Id.
62 History: The 2000s, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, https://www.nflpa.
com/about/history [https://perma.cc/F8TG-ZHTY].
63 NFL Lockout, ESPN (Dec. 5, 2012) http://espn.go.com/nfl/topics/_/page/nfl-
labor-negotiations [https://perma.cc/VH2Q-Q67V].
64 Though the 2006 CBA had an extension clause in it, both parties could opt
out of the extension and thus the whole CBA.
NFL owners vote[d] 32–0 to opt out of the CBA following the 2010 season, 2
years before the extension was originally set to expire. The 2006 CBA
extension allowed either the NFL or NFLPA to [opt] out of the deal following
the 2010 season by November 8, 2008. At the time, the NFL released a
statement reading in part: “The current labor agreement does not adequately
recognize the cost of generating the revenues of which the players receive the
largest shares; nor does the agreement recognize that those costs have
increased substantially—and at an ever increasing rate—in recent years
during a difficult economic climate in our country.”
Id.
65 Id.
66 History: The 2000s, supra note 62.
67 Id.
68 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 5, at arts. 43, 44, 46.
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Agreement.”69 Grievances are to be decided by a panel of four
arbitrators mutually agreed upon by both the NFLPA and NFL.70
The arbitrators’ decision after hearing from representatives of the
grievant and the NFL serves as the final say on the grievance.71
While grievances are to be decided by arbitrators, there
is another type of Commissioner Discipline appeal that is to be
heard by the Commissioner, or his designee, rather than a
mutually agreed upon panel of arbitrators. Article 46 allows the
Commissioner to hear appeals of fines or suspensions he imposed
“for conduct on the playing field . . . [excluding unnecessary
roughness and unsportsmanlike conduct] . . . or involving action
taken against a player by the Commissioner for conduct
detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the
game of professional football.”72 In addition, Section 2(a) of
Article 46 empowers Goodell to serve as the arbitrator over his
own decisions or pick any representative after speaking with
the NFLPA Executive Director (even in the absence of reaching
an agreement).73
While many criticize Goodell for abusing his power as
Commissioner,74 it is the language of the CBA that grants
Goodell the authority to arbitrate appeals of his own disciplinary
decisions for detrimental player conduct.75 Rewriting parts of
Article 46 of the NFL CBA is imperative to prevent partiality
and bias by Goodell and to ensure athletes’ due process rights
are enforced under Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act.
C. Major League Baseball: Road to Today’s CBA
Following baseball’s inception on a professional level in
1868, players frequently switched teams after their one-year
69 Id. at art. 43, § 1.
70 Id. at art. 43, § 6. Of the four arbitrators, one will be appointed Notice
Arbitrator. Id. If one of the four arbitrators is dismissed, the parties must agree on a new
arbitrator within thirty days before the Notice Arbitrator submits a list of ten experienced
arbitrators for the NFLPA and NFL to select a new arbitrator. Id.
71 Id. at art. 43, § 8.
72 Id. at art. 46, § 1(a). If Goodell chooses not to serve as the arbitrator, he can
select others to serve as hearing officers. Id. Section 2(a) of Article 46 states: “[T]he
Commissioner shall, after consultation with the Executive Director of the NFLPA, appoint
one or more designees to serve as hearing officers.” Id. at art. 46, § 2(a). This section also
states: “[T]he Commissioner may serve as hearing officer in any appeal under Section 1(a) of
this Article at his discretion.” Id.
73 Id. at art. 46, § 2(a).
74 Will Graves, NFL Players Say Goodell Abuses His Power, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD (Sept. 5, 2015), http://www.pressherald.com/2015/09/05/nfl-players-say-goodell-
abuses-his-power/ [https://perma.cc/V3R5-WSAY].
75 NFLCollective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 46, §§ 1(a), 2(a).
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contracts expired.76 This led to baseball’s earliest labor dispute
in 1879, as owners wanted to control player contracts and
salaries after their contracts expired so they could retain their
best players during free agency.77 Team owners secretly conspired
to create the reserve clause,78 which essentially gave owners total,
indefinite control over a player’s choice to play for another team.79
In reaction to the reserve clause, the Chicago White Stockings’s
President, John Montgomery Ward, led a band of current baseball
players to form the Brotherhood of Professional Baseball Players
in 1885—the first ever players’ union in baseball.80 While the
formation of MLB’s first union was a major step empowering
players in their employer-employee relationship with the owners,
the Brotherhood only lasted one season as numerous attempts to
unionize over the next eighty years failed because the owners’
promises of consistent pay and work proved more attractive than
union membership.81
In 1965, the players reached out to Marvin Miller, a
United Steelworkers of America economist, who helped them
become more organized and educated as a union.82 Miller’s efforts
led to two great achievements for athletes across the four major
sports. In 1966, Miller led the players in forming the Major
League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA).83 Two years later,
Miller helped the players “negotiate the first-ever collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) in professional sports.”84 The MLB’s
First (1968) and Second (1970) Basic Agreements focused on two
key issues: a minimum salary and a grievance procedure. The
First Agreement allowed an owner-chosen Commissioner to
serve as the arbitrator over grievances brought by players
(similar to the NFL’s current CBA), but the MLB’s Second
Basic Agreement “changed the grievance procedure to one where
76 See Dryer, supra note 47, at 268.
77 Thomas J. Hopkins, Perspectives, Arbitration: A Major League Effect on
Players’ Salaries, 2 SETONHALL J. SPORT L. 301, 303–04 (1992).
78 The reserve clause in a player’s contract bound the player to the original
team he signed with, even if that original contract only covered his first season, for a
long period of time. Reserve Clause, BASEBALL REFERENCE, http://www.baseball
reference.com/bullpen/Reserve_clause [https://perma.cc/PE9T-HNRX]. “For most of
baseball history, the term of reserve was held to be essentially perpetual, so that a player
had no freedom to change teams unless he was given his unconditional release.” Id.
79 The reserve clause allowed owners to submit a list of up to five players the
owners wanted to keep on their teams, so other owners could not sign them and receive the
same treatment to retain their own players. Dryer, supra note 47, at 268.
80 History, MLB PLAYERS (June 29, 2016), http://www.mlbplayers.com/View
Article.dbml?ATCLID=211042995&DB_OEM_ID=34000 [https://perma.cc/M7SY-BMS2].
81 See Dryer, supra note 47, at 269.
82 History, supra note 80.
83 See Dryer, supra note 47, at 269.
84 History, supra note 80.
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a panel of arbitrators outside the Commissioner’s office could be
chosen to handle disputes.”85 Rather than give the Commissioner
the sole authority to serve as the ultimate arbitrator over a
dispute, grievance procedures could be arbitrated by this panel.86
This provision signified the first time in MLB history that
owners (who theoretically controlled the Commissioner) were
not in “total control over player disputes.”87
While the MLBPA continued to make great strides for the
players during the 1970s and 1980s, they still refused to sign the
owners’ CBA proposal in 1994 because they disapproved of the
league’s revenue sharing88 and salary cap.89 This led to a players’
strike in 1994 and the cancellation of the World Series after the
MLBPA refused to sign the proposed CBA that would have cut
players’ salaries and benefits.90 The strike ended right before the
1995–96 season after the NLRB sought an injunction against the
owners, allowing the teams to compete under the 1970 CBA for
the next one and a half seasons.91 A new CBA was reached
between the owners and players in 1997, and many of its
provisions are still intact in MLB’s current CBA.92 Such
provisions include a uniform player’s contract, salary arbitration,
a revenue sharing plan between teams, free agency procedures,
and an extremely detailed grievance procedure.93 The remainder
of this section will explain the MLB’s current arbitration
procedure in depth.
Article XI of the current MLB CBA governs the players’
rights to arbitration hearings for grievances and complaints.94
Whereas NFL players face discipline solely from the
Commissioner of the league for detrimental conduct,95 MLB
players may potentially face disciplinary actions from the
Commissioner, Senior Vice President of Standards and On-Field
85 See Dryer, supra note 47, at 269.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 269–70; Hopkins, supra note 77, at 307.
88 Revenue sharing commonly refers to “sharing operating profits or losses
among associated financial actors.” Sean Ross, How Does Revenue Sharing Work in
Practice?, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/0
10915/how-does-revenue-sharing-work-practice.asp [https://perma.cc/W5GZ-AR9R].
89 See Dryer, supra note 47, at 270–71. Salary caps in professional sports are
a limit on the amount of money a team can spend on players. The amount of money is
often determined by league revenue from the previous year, television contracts, and
profits aggregated from ticket and merchandise sales. See Chris Neiger, How Salary
Cap Changed Sports, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.investopedia.com/
financial-edge/0910/how-salary-caps-changed-sports.aspx [https://perma.cc/BH6V-R5AF].
90 Dryer, supra note 47, at 271.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 4, at art. XI.
94 Id.
95 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 46, § 1.
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Operations, or the players’ respective clubs for “just cause.”96 The
Commissioner is extended further authority to punish a player
for detrimental conduct, but he can defer this power to the
player’s club.97 In comparison to the NFL, the distinction
between “just cause” and “detrimental conduct” is important
because a player is entitled to have his grievance heard by an
impartial arbitration panel only for punishment under the “just
cause” authority.98 This is an important distinction because both
types of conduct are not entitled to the same grievance
procedure outlined in Article XI.99 Within Article XI, an
impartial arbitration panel hears players’ grievances,100 but the
CBA narrowly defines the term “grievance.”101 A grievance is
defined as “a complaint which involves the existence or
interpretation of, or compliance with, any agreement, or any
provision of any agreement, between the Association and the
Clubs . . . or between a Player and a Club,” but disciplinary
action taken by the Commissioner “involving the preservation
of the integrity of, or the maintenance of public confidence in,
the game of baseball” is not considered a grievance.102 By
removing “detrimental conduct” from the definition of
“grievance,” the language of the CBA prevents players from
submitting such complaints to an impartial third party.103 When
such action is taken by the Commissioner, he or she can review
any appeals of his own disciplinary decisions—similar to Article
46 of the NFL—and his decision is deemed the “full, final and
complete disposition of such complaint.”104 The Commissioner is
not to blame for exercising such power following a player appeal,
but rather, it is the language of Article XI of the MLB CBA that
deprives players of due process.
The CBA’s definition of “grievance” also excludes player
conduct on the field or within the ballpark.105 If such conduct
takes place on the field or within the ballpark, players can receive
fines or suspensions imposed on them by the Commissioner or
Senior Vice President of Standards and On-Field Operations,
which will not be heard by a neutral arbitration panel either.106
96 MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 4, at art. XII.
97 Id. at art. XII(B).
98 Id. at art. XII(A).
99 Id. at art. XI.
100 Id. at art. XI(B).
101 See id. at art. XI(A)(1)(a).
102 Id. at art. XI(A)(1)(a), (b).
103 See id. at art. XI(A)(1)(a).
104 Id. at art. XI(A)(1)(b); see also NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra
note 5, at art. 46, § 2(d).
105 MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 4, at art. XI, § (C)(1)(a).
106 Id. at art. XI, § (C)(1)(c).
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Instead, appeals of these fines or suspensions can only be heard
by the Commissioner where his decision is the final say on the
complaint and has “the same effect as a Grievance decision of the
Arbitration Panel.”107
When a player’s complaint is considered a grievance
under the MLB CBA’s limited definition,108 the Labor Relations
Department (LRD) and MLBPA are first given a chance to reach
an agreement to settle the dispute.109 If unable to reach an
agreement, the MLBPA must inform the LRD of its decision to
proceed with the grievance in writing, which leads the MLBPA
or player to appeal in writing “to the Panel Chair for impartial
arbitration.”110 The arbitration panel’s decision will either
“affirm, modify or reverse the decision,” and serve as the final
hearing for the grievance.111
The arbitration panel used in these types of appeals
consists of either an impartial arbitrator or tripartite panel.112
Tripartite panels are made up of the “impartial arbitrator and
two party arbitrators,” one of which is appointed by the MLBPA
and the other appointed by the Commissioner’s office.113 The
panel’s award will be decided by the impartial arbitrator when
acting alone or by a majority vote when the panel is tripartite.114
Regardless of the type of panel formed, the impartial arbitrator
always serves as the Panel Chair who is appointed by the
MLBPA and LRD as a representative of the league.115 While the
Commissioner’s power to review his own disciplinary decisions
for detrimental conduct or player conduct that takes place on
the field is similar to the problems inherent in the NFL CBA,
the arbitration panel used during MLB grievance procedures
mitigates some of this absolute power. The NFL may be able to
use a similar grievance procedure to help lessen Goodell’s
authority, or perhaps propose such a system as a compromise
under a new CBA.
107 Id. at art. XI, § (C)(1)(a).
108 See id. at art. XI, § (A)(1)(a).
109 Id. at art. XI, § (B).
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at art. XI, § (A)(9).
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. If the two sides cannot agree on a candidate to serve as the impartial
arbitrator, they have the option to choose from a list of professional arbitrators supplied
to them by the American Arbitration Association. Id.
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D. National Basketball Association: Road to Today’s CBA
Bob Cousy, former Boston Celtic,116 helped organize the
first union of NBA players in 1954.117 Because the NBA failed
to take the National Basketball Players Association (NBPA)
seriously as an adequate representative of the NBA players, the
players threatened to strike before the 1964 All-Star game.118 The
threatened strike resulted in the first NBA CBA in 1970, which
led to a pension plan and a small per diem.119 Even with the new
CBA, the absence of health benefits and a minimum wage
generated the need for further discussions between players and
the NBA. The first settlement agreement between owners and
players, the Robertson Settlement Agreement (RSA), took place in
1976.120 Between the RSA and the other collective bargaining
agreements that followed in 1980 and 1983, the league saw many
changes develop in the NBA-NBPA dynamic that still exist today,
including the removal of a reserve system (similar to the one used
by the MLB), creation of a salary cap for the league’s financial
stability, and the “Larry Bird Exception.”121
The settlements, agreements, and strikes that occurred
between 1988 and 2005 proved to be crucial to the development
and formation of today’s CBA. After the 1983 CBA expired, the
players sued the owners in 1987 and again in 1994 in two
antitrust lawsuits over the college player draft and salary cap.122
The issues in these lawsuits—combined with disagreement over
revenue sharing and the salary cap—led the NBA to four lockouts
during the 1995, 1996, 1998, and 2011 seasons, respectively.123
The 2005-2011 and 2011-2021 CBAs added maximum salaries,
a mid-level exception, escrow and luxury tax, reductions in
116 Bob Cousy Facts, YOUR DICTIONARY, http://biography.yourdictionary.com/
bob-cousy [https://perma.cc/6N5L-H6HJ].
117 See Larry Coon, Table of Contents: What’s the History of the CBA?, CBA FAQ,
http://www.cbafaq.com/salarycap.htm#Q6 [https://perma.cc/5WGZ-R3M9].
118 See Dryer, supra note 47, at 274–75.
119 See id.
120 Oscar Robertson, NBA LEGENDS, http://www.nba.com/history/robertson_
bio.html [https://perma.cc/6NEK-YW7C].
121 Dryer, supra note 47, at 275. Under this exception, teams could offer veteran
free agents up to 12.5% more of the player’s previous salary from the year before. Id. at
275–76. The Bird rights serve as an exception, although limited by the idea of a luxury
tax, to the salary cap and allow teams to go above the cap when such circumstances like
the Bird rights exist. Id. at 276.
122 See Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987); see also NBA v.
Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
123 Pro Sports Lockouts and Strikes Fast Facts, CNN LIBRARY (May 30, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/03/us/pro-sports-lockouts-and-strikes-fast-facts [https://perma.
cc/9VHT-BDNE]; Jeff Zillgitt, Timeline to the 1998–99 NBA Lockout, USA TODAY, http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/nba/story/2011-10-12/Timeline-to-the-1998-
99-NBA-lockout/50747980/1 [https://perma.cc/ZUN9-RC43].
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contract lengths and raises, and greater penalties for taxpaying
teams.124 In line with these controversial provisions is the
Commissioner’s power to arbitrate player appeals.
Under its current CBA, the NBA Commissioner has the
power to discipline players for on-court conduct and conduct
damaging the “preservation of the integrity of, or maintenance
of public confidence in, the game of basketball.”125 Similar to
the MLB CBA,126 player complaints are heard by a mutually
agreed upon grievance arbitrator at all times, except when the
complaint involves Commissioner action taken to preserve the
integrity of the game of basketball or for player conduct that
occurs on-court.127 The Commissioner may arbitrate over player
actions that fall under these two “special procedures with
respect to player discipline,”128 but in a more limited fashion
than in the NFL and MLB.129
Fines under $50,000 and suspensions of twelve games or
fewer imposed on players by the Commissioner, or his designee,
for on-court conduct or action detrimental to the NBA are
considered lesser punishments.130 An appeal of such a fine or
suspension will not be heard by a grievance arbitrator, but
instead, will be heard directly by the Commissioner if he so
chooses.131 A player can file a grievance to a neutral Grievance
Arbitrator, but if the punishment imposed threatens the
integrity of the game of basketball and is $50,000 or less—or is a
suspension of twelve games or fewer—the Commissioner has the
authority to turn the grievance into an appeal for his review.132 If
the Commissioner’s designee imposes a punishment, the
Commissioner can only “affirm or reduce such fine and/or
suspension, and shall not have authority to increase such fine
and/or suspension.”133 The Commissioner’s decision serves as
the “full, final and complete disposition of the dispute.”134
For harsher punishments where the Commissioner, or
his designee, hands out punishments exceeding $50,000 and/or
suspensions that surpass twelve games, the players can file
their grievances with a mutually agreed upon Grievance
124 See Dryer, supra note 47, at 274–75.
125 NBACollective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 4, at art. XXXI, § 1(b)(ii).
126 MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 4, at art. XII(A), (B).
127 NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 4, at art. XXXI, § 1.
128 Id. at art. XXXI, § 9.
129 See generally id.
130 Id. at art. XXXI, § 9(a).
131 Id.
132 Id. at art. XXXI, § 9(d).
133 Id. at art. XXXI, § 9(a)(4).
134 Id.
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Arbitrator.135 When a Grievance Arbitrator presides over a
Commissioner’s disciplinary action, he or she must apply an
“‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard of review.”136 If the NBPA and
league cannot settle the dispute, a Grievance Arbitrator will
deliver a written decision that serves as the “full, final and
complete disposition of the Grievance.”137
While the NBA grievance procedure seems to be a lot more
developed than that of the NFL, the major difference is the use of
a neutral arbitrator to hear appeals of harsher punishments for
conduct detrimental to the game of basketball—a procedure that
is nonexistent in the NFL. For less severe punishments, the NBA
Commissioner holds the same power as Goodell to review
appeals of his own decisions, but Article XXXI of the NBA CBA
curtails the Commissioner’s power by removing the ability to
review his or her own decisions over harsher punishments and
instead allows them to be decided by a mutually agreed upon
arbitrator.138 Adding this language to Article 46 of the NFL CBA
would help curb Goodell’s power over reviewing his own decisions
and ensure NFL players’ due process rights are not violated.
Taking into account the severity of the punishment in order to
determine the party responsible for arbitrating a player’s appeal
can achieve two purposes. First, it will greatly reduce the
Commissioner’s power and, secondly, contribute to forming a
solution to eradicate the overly broad language of NFL CBA
Article 46. Using similar language from the NHL CBA below will
also help limit the Commissioner’s power under Article 46.
E. National Hockey League: Road to Today’s CBA
Established in 1967, the National Hockey League
Player’s Association (NHLPA) was designed to “represent the
players of the National Hockey League and to guarantee that
their rights as players [were] upheld under the terms of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.”139 Player and owner relations
started unraveling in the early 1990s when the NHLPA initiated
the first general strike against the NHL owners on April 1, 1992,
135 Id. at art. XXXI, § 9(b). If the parties cannot agree, they request and receive a
list of eleven attorneys from the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and
Resolution (CPR) who have had no involvement in professional sports in the last five
years. Id. at art. XXXII, § 6(a). If the two parties cannot agree on an arbitrator in seven
days, they can return the list and delete five names. Id. The CPR Institute then chooses
an arbitrator from the remaining names on the list. Id.
136 Id. at art. XXXI, § 9(b).
137 Id. at art. XXXI, § 6.
138 Id. at art. XXXI, § 9(b).
139 About the NHLPA, NHL ALUMNI, http://nhlalumni.org/national-hockey-
league-players-association/ [https://perma.cc/92MZ-NR5R].
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over the terms of the CBA.140 The strike, the NHLPA’s first
action since its inception,141 was an effective tool to force the
NHL owners to negotiate. After the two sides reached a
settlement that called for a two-year deal, the owners and
players agreed upon several topics including free agency,
arbitration, number of regular season games, and teams’ ability
to play two games in neutral sites per season.142 The next season,
the owners replaced John Ziegler with Gil Stein as NHL
President, and eventually, Gary Bettman.143
Under Bettman’s tenure as Commissioner thus far, the
league has experienced three lockouts in the 1994, 2004, and
2012 seasons, all of which have helped shape the current CBA.
The main issues debated during these lockouts included a
luxury tax, playoff revenue sharing, free agency, a salary cap,
and a new grievance procedure.144 The grievance procedure
discussed below serves as a great resource for the NFL after
which to model Article 46.
Under the NHL’s current CBA, player appeals fall under
“Grievances,” “Supplementary Discipline for On-Ice Conduct,” or
“Commissioner Discipline for Off-Ice Conduct.”145 A grievance is
defined as “any dispute involving the interpretation or application
of, or compliance with, any provision of this Agreement.”146
Grievances, unlike the other two categories of appeals, are to be
decided by an impartial arbitrator.147 If a grievance is filed within
sixty days of the occurrence of the event from which it stems, and
the NHLPA and NHL cannot amicably reach a solution to the
player’s appeal on their own, they can jointly select a member of
the National Academy of Arbitrators to arbitrate the appeal.148
After a hearing takes place, the impartial arbitrator will render a
final decision on the grievance.149
If the player’s conduct falls under “Supplementary
Discipline for On-Ice Conduct,” or “Commissioner Discipline for
140 Joe LaPointe, Hockey; Puck Stops Everywhere as Players Go on Strike, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 2, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/02/sports/hockey-puck-stops-every
where-as-players-go-on-strike.html [https://perma.cc/ZJZ2-3CK2].
141 Jamie Fitzpatrick, NHL Lockouts and Strikes: A History, ABOUT SPORTS,
http://proicehockey.about.com/od/history/a/Nhl-Lockouts-And-Strikes-A-History.htm
[https://perma.cc/2YB4-VN99].




144 Fitzpatrick, supra note 141.
145 NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 4, at arts. 17, 18, 18-A.
146 Id. at art. 17.1.
147 Id.
148 Id. at art. 17.6.
149 Id. at art. 17.13.
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Off-Ice Conduct,” then the NHL Commissioner has the power to
impose punishments on players.150 Under Article 18.1 of the
CBA, the Commissioner (or his designee) can impose a fine or
suspension under his “Supplementary Discipline for On-Ice
Conduct” on a player for “[p]layer conduct either on the ice or in
the [p]layer or penalty bench areas vis-à-vis other participants
in the game . . . in violation of the League Playing Rules.”151 If a
player wants to appeal the Commissioner’s punishment, he or
she must first appeal directly to the Commissioner.152 Similar to
the NBA, the NHL breaks up the penalties within this category
based on the severity of the punishment.153 A suspension of
fewer than six games allows the Commissioner to use discretion
to decide whether a hearing is even required.154 If the suspension
is six games or more, the Commissioner is to hold a hearing
where he may consider all relevant evidence available, and
make a decision on whether to affirm, deny, or modify the
appeal.155 The weight the Commissioner’s decision has is based
on the severity of the punishment. For suspensions of fewer
than six games, the Commissioner’s decision on appeal “shall
be final and binding in all respects and not subject to review.”156
When appeals of suspensions for six games or more are upheld
by the Commissioner, the NHLPA can “file an appeal of the
Commissioner’s determination to the Neutral Discipline
Arbitrator (“NDA”). . . . within seven (7) days from the issuance
of the Commissioner’s determination” if the player so chooses.157
Once an NDA is selected, he or she decides whether the
Commissioner’s suspension or fine of the player was appropriate
in light of the player’s conduct and “whether the length of the
suspension imposed [was] supported by substantial evidence.”158
The NDA’s decision on appeals of suspensions for six games or
more has the same finality as the Commissioner’s decision on
appeals of suspensions of fewer than six games.159
150 Id. at arts. 18, 18-A.
151 Id. at art. 18.1.
152 Id. at art. 18.12.
153 Id. at arts. 18.12, 18.13.
154 NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 4, at art. 18.12.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at art. 18.13(a). Both parties to the dispute have thirty days to mutually
agree upon an NDA to reside over the grievance. Id. In the event that the two sides
cannot agree on an arbitrator or the arbitrator is unable to reside over the case, the
parties can appoint a replacement NDA from the Labor Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association. Id.
158 Id. at art. 18.13(a).
159 Id.
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Article 18-A of the NHL CBA gives the Commissioner
authority to punish players for “Off-Ice Conduct” when one of two
player actions occurs: a player’s actions violate a league rule or
the player “is guilty of conduct . . . that is detrimental to or
against the welfare of the League or the game of hockey.”160 This
type of language seems to be a common theme as it gives the
Commissioner authority to handle player conduct for which
there is no precedent. The Commissioner’s finding of such
violation or conduct can lead to expulsion from the league,
imposition of fines and suspensions, or possible cancellation of
player contracts with their respective teams.161 Following a
Commissioner’s decision to impose punishment on a player, a
player can authorize the NHLPA to appeal to an impartial
arbitrator jointly selected by the NHLPA and NHL from the
National Academy of Arbitrators.162 The standard of review used
by the Arbitrator when examining the Commissioner’s decision
to impose such punishment is “whether the Commissioner’s
determination was supported by substantial evidence and was
not unreasonable.”163 When looking at the evidence, the
arbitrator is to consider the facts relevant to the issue at hand,
the appropriateness of the punishment based on the severity of
the harm, and what is best for both the player and league in
reaching a decision.164 The decision of the Impartial Arbitrator is
final and binding.165
The NHL CBA is better able to curb the Commissioner’s
authority to preside over appeals of his own disciplinary decisions
in comparison to the NFL CBA. The NHL Commissioner is able to
arbitrate appeals concerning less severe punishments for actions
that happen on-ice, but only impartial arbitrators can arbitrate
the Commissioner’s disciplinary conduct for detrimental player
conduct.166 This note’s solution will use and expand upon the NHL
CBA’s complete removal of its Commissioner’s power to arbitrate
his own decisions for players’ detrimental conduct. Removal of
such power from the NFL’s CBA will help diminish the existence
of any partiality during a player appeal and correct the flawed
language that currently grants Goodell too much power over the
NFL’s disciplinary process.
160 Id. at art. 18-A.2.
161 Id.
162 Id. at arts. 17.5, 18-A.4.
163 Id. at art. 18-A.2.
164 Id. at art. 18-A.4.
165 Id. at art. 17.13.
166 Id. at arts. 18.12, 18-A.4.
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II. FLAG ON THE FIELD: ISSUES WITH THENFL CBA
This part will demonstrate that the source of the NFL’s
flawed disciplinary process is the language in Article 46 of the NFL
CBA. The cases of Tom Brady and Adrian Peterson will show how
the deployment of Article 46 allows Goodell to legally arbitrate over
certain appeals under the CBA while simultaneously violating
NFL players’ due process rights under federal law.
Article 46 explicitly grants Goodell the authority to hear
appeals arising from punishments he imposed when player
conduct took place on-field or was deemed detrimental
conduct.167 This control over the NFL’s disciplinary process is a
major reason why players argue that their appeals have fallen
victim to evident partiality on the part of the arbitrator.168 Such
partiality arguments, seen in both Tom Brady’s169 and Adrian
Peterson’s cases,170 factored into challenges brought against
Goodell’s recent decisions—decisions that have ultimately been
subject to appeal in federal court.171 The CBAs of the NBA and
NHL curb their Commissioners’ power by allowing them to
only arbitrate a disciplinary conduct of a certain severity,172 but
Article 46’s grant of power to Goodell allows him to “serve as
hearing officer in any appeal under Section 1(a),” including
detrimental conduct or conduct which takes place on the playing
field.173 Such language grants Goodell the sole authority to
punish a player for any punishment he handed out for
detrimental conduct, regardless of the severity of the
punishment or opinions of others.
Goodell’s option to serve as arbitrator or delegate this
responsibility to an associate of his choosing without restriction,
creates a very real chance of partiality.174 His ability to review an
arbitration of his own disciplinary decision puts him between
the proverbial rock and a hard place, and essentially makes a
mockery of the NFL arbitration process as a whole.
Commissioners are hired to work for team owners, so expecting
a Commissioner to arbitrate fairly over an appeal runs contrary
167 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 46 § 1(a), 2(a).
168 See infra Sections II.A–C.
169 See infra Section II.A.
170 See infra Section II.B.
171 See infra Section II.C.
172 See NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 4, at art. XXXI, § 9;
see also NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 4, at arts. 18, 18-A.
173 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 46,§ 2(a)
(emphasis added).
174 See id.
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to his responsibilities as the League’s Commissioner.175 If
Goodell upholds his own disciplinary decision, the NFLPA will
challenge his impartiality since he works for the owners, but if
he strikes down or lowers his previously imposed punishment,
he “would undermine his own competency as Commissioner,”176
and would run the risk of being fired by the owners.177 Whenever
Goodell elects himself arbitrator, like in Brady’s case,178 or
selects an associate he is known to have close ties with, like
Harold Henderson in Adrian Peterson’s case,179 the players can
always bring a strong argument that the arbitral award should
be set aside due to obvious partiality under Section 10 of the
Federal Arbitration Act.
A. Deflategate
New England Quarterback Tom Brady recently
appealed a four-game suspension imposed by Commissioner
Goodell in the United States District Court, Southern District
of New York.180 In the American Football Conference
Championship game on January 18, 2015, a Colts linebacker
intercepted a pass thrown by Tom Brady.181 The Colts’s
training staff tested the ball and found that its inflation levels,
along with ten other Patriot footballs used that game, were
below the levels required in the Official Playing Rules of the
NFL.182 The media colloquially termed this scandal
175 Robert E. Wallace Jr., Neutral Arbitrators in Sports: What Makes It Fair?,
LAW360 (July 23, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/680682/neutral-arbitrators-in-
sports-what-makes-it-fair [https://perma.cc/G2N6-ZJ4D].
176 NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 474
(S.D.N.Y. 2015).
177 As NFL Commissioner, Goodell is subject to termination under language
within the NFL’s constitution.
In the event that the Commissioner or any other officer of the League shall be
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or be physically or mentally
incapacitated to perform his duties or shall fail or refuse to abide by the
Constitution and Bylaws of the League, and the Executive Committee finds that
such action by such officer is detrimental to the best interests of the League, or in
the event the Commissioner or any other officer of the League fails or is unwilling
to perform his duties, then such Committee shall have the power after notice and
hearing to suspend or remove said officer and to terminate any contract between
such Commissioner or officer and the League.
Constitution and Bylaws of the National Football League art. VI, § 6.5(G) (2006), http://
static.nfl.com/static/content/public/static/html/careers/pdf/co_.pdf [https://perma.cc/CKB7-
86TM].
178 See infra Section II.A.
179 See infra Section II.B.
180 NFL Mgmt. Council, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 452.
181 Id. at 454.
182 Id.
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“Deflategate,”183 since the Patriots were allegedly using
deflated footballs. Despite Brady denying any knowledge of the
deflation of game-used footballs, an investigation led by Ted
Wells184 and NFL Executive Vice President and General
Counsel Jeff Pash found that “it is more probable than not that
Brady was at least generally aware of the inappropriate
activities of McNally and Jastremski [New England personnel]
involving the release of air from Patriots game balls.”185
Because Brady’s actions were deemed “conduct detrimental to
the integrity of and public confidence in the game of
professional football,”186 Goodell was able to select an arbitrator
under his Article 46 authority. Troy Vincent,187 acting under
orders from Goodell, imposed a four-game suspension allowed
by Goodell’s Article 46 authority.188
After the NFLPA appealed Brady’s suspension, Goodell
elected himself arbitrator of Brady’s appeal by exercising his
Article 46 Section 2(a) authority.189 Following Goodell’s decision
to hear Brady’s appeal, the NFLPA filed a motion to Goodell
asking for Goodell to recuse himself from serving as the
arbitrator.190 The NFLPA argued that if Goodell chose to arbitrate
Brady’s appeal, he would have a clear conflict of interest in
reviewing his own decision since he would be (1) deciding the
fairness of a suspension that he imposed, and (2) arbitrating a
decision that could potentially question the credibility of the NFL
staff who worked for him.191 Goodell denied the NFLPA’s motion
to recuse himself and affirmed his own decision to suspend Brady
based on Brady’s alleged obstruction of the NFL investigation (by
having his cell phone destroyed) and for his role in the
Deflategate scheme.192
The NFLPA appealed in federal court to have the award
vacated while the NFL simultaneously asked the court to have
183 Jacob Gershman, NFL Taps Attorney Ted Wells to Lead ‘Deflategate’ Probe,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2015/01/23/nfl-taps-attorney-ted-
wells-to-lead-deflategate-probe/ [https://perma.cc/MYX8-GMPX].
184 Ted Wells is a partner at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP
and has worked on many NFL-related matters. Id.
185 NFL Mgmt. Council, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 454.
186 Id. at 457.
187 Troy Vincent occupies the position of NFL executive V.P. of football
operations. Mike Florio, Transcript Proves NFL Didn’t Know Air Pressure Could Drop
Naturally, NBC SPORTS (Aug. 5, 2015), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2015/08/05/
transcript-proves-nfl-didnt-know-air-pressure-could-drop-naturally/ [https://perma.cc/H
866-T88Y].
188 NFL Mgmt. Council, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 456–57.
189 Id. at 457.
190 Id. at 458.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 458, 463, 466.
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the award approved.193 Judge Richard M. Berman presided over
the NFLPA’s appeal and reached a decision without even
addressing some of Brady’s claims.194 In light of Section 10 of the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),195 the court recognized its ability
to vacate Goodell’s award if any parts of Section 10 were
“affirmatively shown to exist.”196 While a court reviewing an
arbitrator’s decision is supposed to show great deference, enforce
limits on judicial scrutiny, and ensure fairness—due process is
still required.197 The district court focused on whether Goodell’s
authority to affirm Brady’s punishment came from the CBA, a
neutral, legally binding source agreed upon by the NFL and
NFLPA, rather than Goodell’s individual reasoning.198 Judge
Berman vacated Goodell’s decision, finding that Goodell’s denying
Brady’s legal team “equal access to investigative files, including
witness interview notes” and the chance to examine Jeff Pash was
“fundamentally unfair and in violation of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3)” and
that Brady was prejudiced as a result.199 The court also found
“legal deficiencies” in Goodell’s award that lacked proper notice
of the potential discipline Brady could receive in deflating
footballs if found to have actually participated in the ball-
tampering scheme.200
Tom Brady’s four-game suspension was later reinstated
by the U.S. Court of Appeals following the NFL’s appeal.201 The
court reversed the lower court’s judgment finding that Brady
was not denied fundamental fairness since the commissioner
correctly utilized and applied his broad discretion allocated by
Article 46 of the NFL CBA.202 Rather than decide if Brady
contributed to the deflation of game-used footballs, or if Goodell
serving as arbitrator over his disciplinary decision demonstrates
facial partiality, the court stated that its sole responsibility was
to determine whether Goodell—acting as arbitrator—acted
within the scope of the NFL CBA.203 The court did, however,
explicitly state that the bargained-for “authority was especially
193 Id. at 452.
194 Id. at 473.
195 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C § 10 (2012).
196 NFL Mgmt. Council, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 462.
197 Id. at 462.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 463, 473.
200 Id. at 463.
201 Conor Orr, Tom Brady’s Four-Game Suspension Reinstated by Court, NFL
(Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000655649/article/tom-bradys-
fourgame-suspension-reinstated-by-court [https://perma.cc/3DVM-KRRB].
202 Id.; see NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527, 532 (2d
Cir. 2016).
203 NFL Mgmt. Council, 820 F.3d at 532.
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broad.”204 In ruling for the NFL, the court found that even
though the NFL CBA by saying the “tripartite” of allowing the
Commissioner to investigate player violations, impose
punishment, and arbitrate his own discipline is “unorthodox,”
both parties to the CBA agreed to it.205 The court’s reinstatement
of Brady’s suspension, despite its recognition of Article 46’s
breadth, shows that Goodell did not do anything wrong, but
acted under his authority given to him by the mutually agreed
upon NFL CBA.206 The court’s decision in the “Deflategate”
scandal clearly demonstrates that Goodell’s decision-making is
not the problem, but rather it is the mutually agreed upon
language of Article 46 that is the issue.
B. Adrian Peterson
Adrian Peterson, a running back for the Minnesota
Vikings, was charged and indicted by a Texas grand jury for
“felony reckless or negligent injury of a child” after a dispute
arose involving Peterson’s son.207 While Peterson’s charges were
pending, the NFL and NFLPA agreed that Peterson would be
placed on the Commissioner’s Exempt List,208 where he remained
following his plea agreement that reduced the charges down to
a misdemeanor for reckless assault.209
The NFL granted Peterson a hearing to decide if it would
impose discipline for violating the League’s Personal Conduct
Policy in addition to any punishment Peterson received under
state criminal law.210 Goodell imposed punishment on Peterson
after finding that Peterson’s conduct “was detrimental to the
league” and that he “appeared inclined to repeat the behavior in
the future.”211 Just prior to Peterson’s League hearing, but after
his criminal allegations, Goodell instituted a “New Policy” of
discipline intended to deal with domestic violence issues following




207 NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1087 (D. Minn. 2015).
208 Kevin Patra, What Is the Reserve/Commissioner Exempt List?, NFL (Sept.
17, 2014), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000396169/article/what-is-the-exempt-
list [https://perma.cc/ZX2P-NJJX] (“The Exempt List is a special player status available
to clubs only in unusual circumstances. The List includes those players who have been
declared by the Commissioner to be temporarily exempt from counting within the Active
List limit. Only the Commissioner has the authority to place a player on the Exempt List.”).
209 NFL Players Ass’n, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 1087.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 1088.
212 See id. In the case of Ray Rice, he was initially suspended for two games by
Goodell after meeting with the Commissioner to discuss Rice’s assault of his fiancée in
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Peterson receiving an unpaid suspension for “at least the
remainder of the 2014 season,” a fine, and Commissioner-ordered
counseling with an NFL designated therapist.213
The NFLPA appealed Goodell’s disciplinary decision,
which triggered the disciplinary process under Article 46,
alleging multiple issues with Peterson’s punishment.214 It argued
that the Commissioner’s application of the New Policy was
impermissible; the implementation of the New Policy deprived
Peterson of a fair disciplinary process thereby preventing him
from taking part in pre-disciplinary discussions; and Goodell’s
order of mandated psychiatric treatment was not a punishment
available under the CBA.215 Similar to Brady’s case, the NFLPA
asked that Goodell recuse himself and have the appeal be heard
by a neutral arbitrator.216 Goodell granted the NFLPA’s request
to recuse himself and designated Harold Henderson217 to serve
as the hearing officer over Peterson’s arbitration.218 Fearing that
Henderson’s close ties to Goodell would cause “evident partiality,”
the NFLPA requested that Henderson also recuse himself from
hearing the appeal.219 Not only did Henderson decline to recuse
himself, but he also completely ignored the NFLPA’s argument
against Goodell’s retroactive use of the New Policy on Peterson.220
Henderson instead found that the New Policy “was entirely ‘fair
and consistent’” and well within the “broad discretion” that
Goodell had under the New Policy.221 The NFLPA also argued
that Goodell’s refusal to grant Peterson a hearing before imposing
discipline violated Peterson’s rights. Henderson rejected this
argument, yet, provided very little reasoning to support his
decision.222 Henderson also side-stepped the issue of league-
an elevator. Louis Bien, A Complete Timeline of the Ray Rice Assault Case, SB NATION
(Nov. 28, 2014), http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2014/5/23/5744964/ray-rice-arrest-assault-
statement-apology-ravens [https://perma.cc/SU8B-CLQ9]. After a video was released
that explicitly showed what happened in the elevator, Goodell suspended Rice
indefinitely and created a new domestic violence policy to be applied prospectively. Id.
213 NFL Players Ass’n, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 1088.
214 Id. at 1088.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Harold Henderson “served as the NFL[’s] Executive Vice President for Labor
Relations and Chairman of the NFL Management Council Executive Committee for 16
years” from 1991 to 2007. Laura Amato,Harold Henderson: 5 Fast Facts You Need to Know,
HEAVY (July 10, 2015), http://heavy.com/sports/2015/07/harold-henderson-greg-hardy-
suspension-appeal-reduced-suspension-nfl-roger-goodell/ [https://perma.cc/5T6C-ZYHH].
218 NFL Players Ass’n, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 1088.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 1088–89.
221 Id. at 1089.
222 See id.
2016] BETWEEN THE HASH MARKS 419
ordered counseling by claiming that the Commissioner had the
right to order such counseling.223
Like in the Brady case, the NFLPA sought to have
Henderson’s arbitral award vacated by appealing to federal
court under violations of Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act and Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act.224
In reviewing Peterson’s appeal, the court noted that while labor
arbitrators are given substantial deference, courts must vacate
arbitral awards if the arbitrator is enforcing his own sense of
justice outside of the bounds of the established CBA.225 Among
the NFLPA’s arguments, the court only reached two of its four
claims because District Court Judge David S. Doty found that
enough evidence existed to vacate the arbitral award based on
the first two claims.226 Judge Doty held that Henderson’s award
failed to “draw its essence from the CBA,” meaning that
Henderson upheld Goodell’s punishment even though it was
well-established that the New Policy was to be applied
prospectively rather than retroactively.227 Because Goodell’s
New Policy was to be applied prospectively,228 rather than
retrospectively, Henderson should have overturned Goodell’s
punishment since it did not draw its essence from the CBA.
Doty’s decision to vacate the arbitral award also focused on
Henderson exceeding his authority as arbitrator.229 Rather than
answer the question of whether the League’s New Policy could
be applied retroactively, Henderson answered whether the
punishment Peterson received was consistent with the League’s
older disciplinary policy.230 Henderson’s decision to answer the
wrong question—conscious or not—in combination with his
arbitral award not coming from the binds of the CBA, convinced
Judge Doty to vacate the award.
C. Existence of Evident Partiality
Judge Berman and Judge Doty both found for Brady and
Peterson in the District Court, respectively, before reaching
either of their evident partiality arguments on the part of
Goodell (Brady’s case) and his designee, Harold Henderson
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id. (citing Associated Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local
No. 53, 751 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 2014)).
226 Id. at 1092.
227 Id. at 1091.
228 Id. at 1090.
229 Id. at 1092.
230 Id.
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(Peterson’s case).231 Cases which were completely different—as
Brady’s case focused on on-field conduct while Peterson’s case
concerned off-field conduct—both demonstrated the courts’
reluctance to weigh in on “Goodell’s dual role as commissioner
and arbitrator,”232 which is the crux of the NFL’s flawed
disciplinary process. Goodell is allowed to arbitrate his own
disciplinary decisions while also expected to remain impartial
despite his employment being determined by the owners.233 In
Brady’s case, the NFLPA called Goodell “hopelessly biased” and
an evidently prejudiced arbitrator234 since his “competency as
Commissioner” was jeopardized.235 The NFLPA alluded to three
key points while arguing that Goodell could not be unbiased as
an arbitrator: (1) improper delegation of power to Troy Vincent
to impose punishment on Brady, (2) faulty justification of his
decision based on evidence not used when the initial punishment
was imposed, and (3) public praise of the Wells Report before
naming himself arbitrator.236 While the first two factors could
be argued either way, Goodell’s public praise of the Wells
Report237 clearly showed he could not be impartial. In response to
the NFLPA, the NFL argued, and the Second Circuit agreed,238
that “the CBA specifically grants the Commissioner the power he
exercised over Brady’s case. Nothing in the CBA stops the
commissioner from serving as an arbitrator when his own conduct
is being challenged.”239
231 See NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 473
(S.D.N.Y. 2015); see also NFL Players Ass’n, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 1092.
232 Julia R. Perdue, Deflategate: The Elephant in the Courtroom, BLOOMBERG
BNA (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.bna.com/deflategate-elephant-courtroom-b171799362
75/ [https://perma.cc/L2B6-WHVH].
233 See Howard Bryant, Roger Goodell’s Bosses, ESPN (Jan. 8, 2013), http://espn.
go.com/nfl/story/_/id/8822087/roger-goodell-works-owners-not-game [https://perma.cc/A5E
S-NW8R].
234 Jeff Zalesin, NFL Union Says Brady’s Deflategate Arbitration Wasn’t Fair,
LAW360 (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/689157/nfl-union-says-brady-s-de
flategate-arbitration-wasn-tfair?article_related_content=1 [https://perma.cc/TM6T-R3YU].
235 Id.
236 Mike Garafolo, Brady Decision Was a Blow for NFL, Commissioner, but It Did
the League One Favor, FOX SPORTS (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.foxsports.com/nfl/story/tom-
brady-deflategate-new-england-patriots-ruling-stopped-short-of-setting-precedent-090315
[https://perma.cc/XV9G-34MT].
237 The Wells report was a report that covered the Patriots involvement in
“Deflategate.” Of the 243 reports, the main takeaways were that “It is more probable
than not that New England Patriots personnel participated in violations of the Playing
Rules” and “Tom Brady (the quarterback for the Patriots) was at least generally aware
of the inappropriate activities of McNally and Jastremski involving the release of air
from Patriots game balls.” Key Takeaways from Ted Wells Report, AROUND THENFL (May
6, 2015), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000491524/article/key-takeaways-from-
ted-wells-report [https://perma.cc/439B-2G64].
238 NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527, 532 (2d Cir. 2016).
239 Zalesin, supra note 234.
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In Peterson’s case, the NFLPA said that “[a] long-time
NFL Executive and current legal consultant cannot, by definition,
be a neutral arbitrator.”240 These arguments in court pertaining to
evident partiality, although unanswered, show how the decisions
of Goodell and Henderson to not recuse themselves and to
arbitrate the appeals were simultaneously legal under the NFL
CBA, and most likely illegal under section 10 of the FAA due to
inescapable partiality. This demonstrates that it is the language
of Article 46, rather than Goodell’s actions that creates violations
of federal law.
If either Judge Berman or Judge Doty in the District
Court, or Chief Justice Katzmann in the Second Circuit, had
ruled on the evident partiality claim, he would have been likely to
find that neither Goodell nor Henderson was impartial under
Morris v. N.Y. Football Giants.241 TheMorris court concluded that
Commissioner Tagliabue, Goodell’s predecessor as Commissioner,
could not be neutral when serving as arbitrator based on his role
as Commissioner and prior history of advocating for the owners.242
Based on Goodell’s role as Commissioner (where he is an
“employee of the owners”)243 and Henderson’s previous experience
as a “NFL Executive and current league consultant,”244 Judge
Berman and Judge Doty would have found that neither Goodell
nor Henderson were impartial arbitrators, leading to both arbitral
awards being thrown out. It is arguable whether Goodell’s
punishments are within bounds of the CBA regardless of Brady’s
case being overturned, but it is undisputed that the process
illustrated in Article 46 of the NFL CBA legally put Goodell in
a position to unilaterally decide a player’s suspension.
III. THE PREVIOUS PLAY ISUNDER REVIEW: DEPLOYMENT OF
THEOTHER LEAGUES’ CBAS
This part provides an analysis of how the MLB, NBA,
and NHL handle their players’ appeals for detrimental conduct
or conduct that takes place on the field, court, or rink in
comparison to the NFL. Comparing the CBAs of all four leagues
will demonstrate the lack of due process created by the language
of Article 46 of the NFL CBA.
240 Mike Florio, Union Questions Harold Henderson’s Neutrality, NBC SPORTS
(Nov. 21, 2014), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2014/11/21/union-questions-harold-
hendersons-neutrality/ [https://perma.cc/RJD7-8JMJ].
241 Morris v. N.Y. Football Giants, Inc., 575 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 1016–17 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1991).
242 Id.
243 Bryant, supra note 233.
244 See Florio, supra note 240.
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A. Major League Baseball’s CBA in Action
While the MLB has yet to encounter a situation where a
Commissioner imposed a punishment on a player and then
arbitrates his or her own decision, former Commissioner Bud
Selig’s suspension of Alex Rodriguez in 2013 almost led to such
a situation. The MLB initially banned Rodriguez for 211 games
after finding “overwhelming evidence” that he “not only obtained
illegal performance-enhancing substances from the now-
shuttered Biogenesis anti-aging clinic in South Florida, but also
sought to hinder their investigation into those allegations.”245
Despite the league having an arbitration process in place
pertaining to steroids and performance-enhancing drugs agreed
upon in the Joint Drug Agreement,246 former Commissioner Bud
Selig could have asserted his “conduct detrimental to the game”
authority.247 If Selig asserted his detrimental conduct authority,
he could have arbitrated Rodriguez’s appeal rather than have it
heard by an independent arbitrator.248
Although Selig chose not to discipline Rodriguez for
detrimental conduct,249 the MLB’s Commissioner’s authority
under Article XI section A(1)(b) would have allowed Selig to
unilaterally punish Rodriguez and arbitrate an appeal over his
own disciplinary decision. Even though suspensions can be
determined by other MLB executives,250 which may reduce the
chance of partiality, the Commissioner still has the same ability
as the NFL Commissioner to arbitrate his own disciplinary
decisions. In rewriting the language of Article 46 of the NFL
CBA, drafters should use language from the CBAs of the NBA
and NHL, which reduce the Commissioner’s disciplinary
authority, rather than that of the MLB CBA, which grants the
Commissioner too much power.
245 Paul Hagen, Arbitrator: A-Rod Suspended for 2014 Season, MLB (Jan. 11,
2014), http://m.mlb.com/news/article/66433260/arbitrator-rules-alex-rodriguez-to-be-susp
ended-for-2014-season/ [https://perma.cc/8V77-BX8B].
246 SeeMajor League Baseball Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program § 8
(2006), http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/jda.pdf [https://perma.cc/CP35-SMR4].
247 SeeMLB Basic Agreement, supra note 4, at arts. XI(A)(1)(b), XII(A).
248 Id. at arts. XI(A)(1)(b), XII(A).
249 Erica Zonder, Judge, Jury, and Executioner: The Commissioner and the
“Integrity of the Game,” SPORT IN AM. HISTORY (Sept. 14, 2015), http://ussporthistory.
com/2015/09/14/judge-jury-and-executioner-the-commissioner-and-the-integrity-of-the-
game/ [https://perma.cc/ED85-CQK9].
250 MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 4, at art. XII(A).
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B. National Basketball Association’s CBA in Action
Like the MLB, the NBA has yet to encounter a situation
where the Commissioner has arbitrated his or her own
disciplinary decision. Looking at an in-game brawl between the
Indiana Pacers and Detroit Pistons demonstrates how
independent arbitrators are crucial to due process in the event
the Commissioner excessively punishes a player. While the
Commissioner did not arbitrate any of his own suspensions,
disciplinary conduct imposed on players involved in this
incident, which became known as “Malice at the Palace,” shows
why independent arbitrators are needed. The “Malice at the
Palace” was the media’s name for the brawl that ensued
between multiple players and fans in the closing minutes of a
Detroit Pistons and Indiana Pacers game at the Palace of
Auburn Hills.251 Following the fight, Pacers player Jermaine
O’Neal received a suspension of twenty-five games.252 Despite
former Commissioner Stern’s authority to unilaterally impose
suspensions for on-court conduct according to the NBA CBA,253
the union appealed the Commissioner’s decision to arbitrator
Roger Kaplan. As union director Billy Hunter said, “The action
taken by the commissioner sets a new high-water mark in
terms of the kind of discipline he feels he can impose, . . . . I
think he has exceeded his authority and should be subject to
review and challenge.”254 Both arbitrator Roger Kaplan and
U.S. District Judge George B. Daniels, in an appeal by the
NBA, found that former Commissioner Stern’s suspension was
excessive and reduced it to fifteen games.255
O’Neal’s suspension did not necessarily question the
ability of the NBA Commissioner to arbitrate his own
disciplinary actions, but instead, showed why the Commissioner
should not have absolute discretion over player discipline.
Neutral arbitrators are needed because Commissioners may
make mistakes when punishing players, and allowing a
Commissioner to have the ability to arbitrate his own decisions is
251 Satchel Price, How ‘Malice at the Palace’ Changed the Careers of Six Key
Pacers, SBNATION (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.sbnation.com/2014/11/19/7246943/
malice-at-the-palace-anniversary-pacers-pistons-ron-artest [https://perma.cc/W4R9-YKE3].
252 Suspensions Without Pay, Won’t Be Staggered, ESPN (Nov. 22, 2004),
http://www.espn.com/nba/news/story?id=1928540 [https://perma.cc/73BD-NU5E].
253 See NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 4, at art. XXXI, § 9.
254 Chris Sheridan, Union Appeals Suspensions for Artest, O’Neal, Jackson,
THE ST. AUGUSTINE RECORD (Nov. 24, 2004), http://staugustine.com/stories/112404/
spo_2724749.shtml#.WCVllRIrKt8 [https://perma.cc/2EEW-4SGB].
255 Larry Neumeister, O’Neal Doesn’t Have to Finish Brawl Suspension, USA
TODAY (Dec. 31, 2004), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/nba/pacers/20
04-12-30-oneal-judge-suspension_x.htm [https://perma.cc/Q43N-NWXY].
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bound to lead to partiality. While players are protected from
potential Commissioner partiality for harsher punishments by
having their appeals sent to neutral arbitrators, players are not
awarded the same protection for appeals of lesser punishments
because the Commissioner retains his authority to serve as
arbitrator.256 While the NFL should utilize a similar system
when rewriting Article 46, where the use of an arbitrator is
based on the severity of the punishment, it should go one step
further and completely remove the Commissioner from being
able to review appeals of his own decisions. Because complete
removal of the Commissioner from the appeals process is easier
said than done, removing his arbitral power over harsher
punishments could serve as a good middle ground for the next
NFL CBA. This will help ensure the protection of players’ due
process rights and the impartiality of the arbitrator in
situations where the players’ due process rights are most likely
to be jeopardized.
C. National Hockey League’s CBA in Action
The recent suspension of Dennis Wideman, a defenseman
for the Calgary Flames, demonstrates how the NHL appeals
process operates under its most recent CBA. While playing the
Nashville Predators, another player checked Wideman into the
boards, causing him to hit his head.257 While slowly making his
way to the bench, Wideman cross-checked in-game NHL referee,
Don Henderson, with his stick.258 After the game, both Wideman
and Henderson were both diagnosed with concussions.259 Despite
the concussion, the NHL stated that “Wideman maintained
continued awareness of his circumstances, refused medical
attention and played the remainder of the game, thereby
showing no signs that he was disoriented to the extent required
to not be responsible for his on-ice conduct.”260 The NHL
suspended Wideman for twenty games261 for his on-ice conduct,
conduct that enables the Commissioner (or his designee) to issue
256 See id.
257 Matthew Heimlich, In Brief: The Dennis Wideman Suspension and
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a fine or suspension under his “Supplementary Discipline for
On-Ice Conduct” authority.262
Wideman appealed his suspension to Neutral Discipline
Arbitrator (NDA) James Oldham, after Commissioner Bettman
issued a ruling upholding Wideman’s twenty-game suspension.263
Oldham reduced Wideman’s suspension to ten games, as he
claimed to take Wideman’s “concussed state” into account,
believing he did not mean to injure Henderson.264 The NHL
quickly filed a complaint in the United States District Court265
claiming that “Oldham ‘exceeded his authority under the CBA’ by
substituting his own judgment for that of the Commissioner.”266
The NHL not only sought to have Oldham’s ruling vacated,
arguing that he acted outside the scope of the CBA, but also
fired Oldham as a NDA.267 The court has yet to rule on the
NHL’s motion for summary judgment and NHLPA’s counter
motion to dismiss the NHL’s suit to vacate Oldham’s decision.268
In comparing the CBAs of the four leagues, Wideman’s
case shows that the NHL CBA does the best job of restraining
Commissioner Bettman’s power to arbitrate his own disciplinary
decisions. Bettman is allowed to hear appeals of his own
punishments for on-ice conduct, but his ruling is not final.269 As
illustrated in Wideman’s case, the player was able to appeal the
Commissioner’s decision to an NDA.270 The NHL CBA provides
the best guidance for rewriting Article 46 of the NFL CBA
because it goes one step further than the NBA CBA and removes
its Commissioner from arbitrating player appeals for detrimental
conduct.271 Part IV of this note will utilize various parts of the
other leagues’ CBAs in an effort to reconstruct Article 46 to
ensure arbitrator impartiality and protection of players’ due
process rights guaranteed by section 10 of the FAA.
262 See NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 4, at art. 18.
263 Heimlich, supra note 257.
264 Id.
265 Id.; NHL Appeals to U.S. District Court in Dennis Wideman Case, ESPN
(June 8, 2016), http://www.espn.com/nhl/story/_/id/16055948/nhl-seeks-vacate-decision-
dennis-wideman-calgary-flames [https://perma.cc/UE3X-YUYN].
266 Heimlich, supra note 257.
267 Id. It is interesting to note that the NHL terminated Oldham after siding
against the NHL—a fate that Goodell could potentially face since he is also at the will
of the NFL.
268 Id.
269 SeeNHL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 4, at arts. 18.12, 18.13.
270 See Heimlich, supra note 257.
271 See NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 4, at art. 18.13.
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IV. AFTER REVIEW, THE RULING ON THE FIELD IS
OVERTURNED: REWRITING ARTICLE 46 OF THENFL CBA
An influx of recent litigation combined with an in-depth
analysis of the other leagues’ CBAs shows that Commissioner
Goodell has too much power to review appeals of his own
decisions after he imposes punishment on a player for on-field
conduct or detrimental conduct. The methods the NBA and
NHL use to curb their commissioners’ power mentioned above,
demonstrate possible ways for the NFL to remove some of
Goodell’s disciplinary authority. The NFLPA should renegotiate
the terms of Article 46 with the owners and revise Section 2(a) to
not only prevent Goodell, or his designee, from arbitrating his
own disciplinary decisions, but to have the Commissioner
completely removed from the appeals process entirely. By
rewriting this provision, the NFL can implement a two-tier
appeals system that mirrors parts of the NBA’s and NHL’s
CBAs in one step, and establishes a five-person committee to
review harsher punishments in another step.
Although the courts did not reach the question of the
arbitrator’s partiality in the Brady or Peterson cases, any player
appeal that has Goodell or his designee as the arbitrator is going
to face a strong claim of “evident partially” under section 10 of
the FAA. To combat this problem, and remove ultimate power
from Goodell (or his designee), the first step would be to remove
the language of Article 46 that says, “the Commissioner may
serve as hearing officer in any appeal under Section 1(a) of this
Article.”272 The second step would be to determine who can
arbitrate player appeals for disciplinary action by Goodell based
on the severity of the punishment, similar to the CBAs of the
NBA and NHL. Taking into account the length of the NFL
season273 compared to those of the NBA and NHL,274 suspensions
of four games or fewer and fines of less than $25,000 should be
sent to a neutral arbitrator who is far removed from the initial
disciplinary action and not hand-picked by Goodell. Rather than
merely require the Commissioner to consult with the NFLPA over
designating an arbitrator,275 Section 2(a) of Article 46 should be
rewritten to read: “For appeals under Section 1(a) above, the
Commissioner is required to consult with the Executive Director
of the NFLPA to appoint one or more designees to serve as
272 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 46, § 2(a).
273 See NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 31.
274 See NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 4, at art. XXXI, § 9;
see also NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 5, at art. XVIII, §§ 9–12.
275 See NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 46, § 2(a).
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hearing officers. The Commissioner cannot appoint a designee
unless he or she is agreed upon by the NFLPA.” The NFL CBA can
then mirror the language of the NBA or NHL CBAs and
condition that if the Commissioner and NFLPA fail to agree on
a neutral arbitrator, the CPR Institute Labor Arbitration
Association will supply a list of arbitrators with a specific
background in sports law.276 The first tier of this proposed solution
removes Goodell’s authority to arbitrate his own disciplinary
decisions, and helps prevent evident partiality by allowing lesser
punishments to be reviewed by neutral arbitrators rather than by
the Commissioner.
While the first tier of this solution will limit the
Commissioner’s ability to arbitrate his or her own decisions, the
second tier will set up a five-person committee to handle all
disciplinary conduct imposed by the NFL Commissioner for
harsher punishments that involve player action that takes place
on-field or is deemed detrimental conduct. Both the NFLPA and
team owners will be able to vote on the five members elected to
the Committee who will each serve a four-year term before being
eligible for reelection. Adding this provision ensures that no
member will be unilaterally employed by either the owners or
the players, so he or she can remain impartial. In order to serve
on this committee, special requirements must be met in order to
ensure fair procedures for both athletes and the Leagues.
Committee members cannot have worked for either the Players’
Associations or Leagues alone, respectively, to serve on this
committee, but may if he or she spent time working on “both
sides of the ball.” Ideally, a five-person committee would be
made up of one NFLPA representative, one NFL representative,
and three neutral committee members who meet these special
requirements. By establishing a Committee with clear cut rules
regarding who can serve and under what circumstances the
Committee will hear such grievances, players will be more likely
to receive fair appeals that ensure due process rights,
transparency will be encouraged, and arbitrators will be
immune to evident partiality and likely to gain expertise over
these types of matters. The decision of this Committee will be
the final say on each grievance.
276 See NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 5, at art. XXXI,
§ 7(b); NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 4, at art. XVIII, § 14.
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CONCLUSION
As illustrated by the cases of Tom Brady and Adrian
Peterson, the NFL will continue to be at risk of an impending
lawsuit anytime Commissioner Goodell exercises his ability to
arbitrate player appeals of his own disciplinary decisions.
While Goodell is acting within the bounds of the CBA, it is
evident that Article 46’s grant of power to the Commissioner
is flawed, as it calls on the Commissioner to be impartial
while still working for the owners. Furthermore, even though
neither Judge Berman nor Judge Doty reached the evident
partiality claim in the cases of Brady or Peterson, that claim
under section 10(2) of the FAA will always present an
extremely difficult hurdle for the federal court to overcome
when Goodell has to prove he was not biased in upholding his
own decision. In order for the NFL to fix its disciplinary process
and prevent players from appealing to federal court on evident
partiality grounds, Article 46 must be rewritten to reflect and
run parallel with federal law. When the NFLPA and team
owners negotiate the next CBA, they will have the advantage of
looking at the CBAs of the MLB, NBA, and NHL to see what has
and has not worked for the other leagues. Looking at different
aspects of each CBA and learning from the cases of Brady and
Peterson should show that claims of partiality and failure to
adhere to players’ due process rights can easily be diminished by
removing Goodell’s authority to arbitrate the appeals of his own
disciplinary decisions. Removing Goodell from the arbitration
process, and replacing him with an impartial arbitrator for lesser
punishments and a special committee for harsher punishments,
will enhance players’ due process rights under federal law and
prevent player grievances from requiring further litigation in
federal court.
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